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Abstract 
This paper investigates the relationship between credit market competition and the 
availability of bank credit for firms of unobserved credit quality when firms pledge collateral 
to secure the loans. Loan data from the Spanish Credit Register shows that the average 
credit quality of borrowers that get loans in a provincial market decreases with market 
concentration (which is shown to be positively correlated with market power) and with the 
availability of collateral, although the marginal effect of each variable decreases for higher 
values of the other. We also find that credit lines’ interest rates increase with the availability of 
collateral, but the increase is lower for banks operating in more concentrated credit markets.  
Therefore market power in credit markets and collateral appear as substitutes to increase 
the availability of bank finance under asymmetric information. 
JEL classification: G21. 
Keywords: collateral; competition; asymmetric information; relationship banking. 
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1 Introduction 
Are collateral and credit market competition complements or substitutes when it comes to 
facilitate bank credit to firms of different quality? Petersen and Rajan (1995) show that under 
information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders young and opaque firms will have 
more credit available and at lower cost in credit markets where banks have market power 
than in perfectly competitive credit markets. This welfare enhancing effect of market power of 
banks challenges the most conventional view that market power causes a social dead weight 
loss. However, little is known about how credit market competition and use of collateral 
interact in determining the availability and cost of credit, even though to pledge collateral is a 
well-documented common practice in loan contracts1. If we find that collateral is an 
alternative to market power in increasing credit availability to firms, then fostering competition 
in credit markets at the pace at which more collateral is available will increase both static and 
dynamic efficiency of credit markets. This paper provides empirical evidence supporting this 
conclusion. The literature that focuses on the role played by financial markets in economic 
growth2 largely ignores collateral availability. The results presented here call for a more careful 
scrutiny of the role played by collateral in determining the relationship between financial 
development and economic growth. 
Townsend (1982) shows that multi period contracting is more efficient than single 
period contracting in dealing with adverse selection and moral hazard.  Credit availability to 
firms will increase when lending banks have market power, compared with credit availability 
when they do not, because market power makes more difficult for borrowing firms to 
renegotiate the contract ex post and consequently multiperiod contracting becomes more 
feasible [Petersen and Rajan (1995)]. On the other hand, Bester (1985), and Besanko and 
Thakor (1987a and b), among others, show that to pledge collateral can mitigate adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems in credit markets. Therefore, collateral can be an 
alternative to market power of banks to increase availability of bank finance for firms. 
In this paper we evaluate the substitution between market power and collateral 
by extending the Petersen and Rajan model on multiperiod contracting. This will allow 
banks to ask for collateral as a condition for granting a loan. Petersen and Rajan show that 
market power lowers the lower bound of credit quality of new borrowers that get finance, 
since it increases the pay off of the bank in future periods. The extended model shows 
that collateral also lowers the average quality of borrowers that get bank finance in a given 
credit market. The reason is that with collateral banks can ask for higher interest rates in 
the first period without violating the moral hazard constraint that forces borrowers to 
choose the good project. Consequently, the acceptable probability that the borrower is of 
good quality, from the break-even condition of the bank, can be lower. Thus, our extension 
shows that the effect of higher market power in credit availability is lower in markets with 
collateral than in markets without collateral. In other words, collateral and market power are 
substitutes when it comes to increase credit availability. 
In addition, the paper investigates the consequences of the interaction between 
collateral and market power in determining the loan interest rate. First period interest rate is 
                                                                          
1. See Berger and Udell (1990); Harhof and Körting (1998); Jiménez, Salas and Saurina (2006), and John, Lynch and 
Puri (2003).  
2. See King and Levine (1993), Levine and Zervos (1998) or Rajan and Zingales (1998). 
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an increasing function of the lower bound in borrowers’ credit quality in the particular market. 
Variables that affect the lower bound such as market power and collateral will affect the 
interest rate. The prediction from the model is that the average interest rate in bank loans to 
borrowers of unobserved credit quality will increase for banks lending in markets where lower 
credit quality borrowers get loans, but the increase will be lower in markets where banks have 
more market power. The result is expected to hold when credit quality is substituted by 
availability of collateral. 
Empirical predictions are tested using extensive data from two different Spanish 
datasets. On the one hand, the Spanish Credit Register (CIR), which collects all bank loans 
granted to non-financial firms between 1985 and 2002. From these database we construct 
measures of credit risk of borrowers that get bank loans, credit market concentration and use 
of collateral, in each of the 50 geographic markets (Spanish provinces) at the end of the year. 
On the other hand, we also collect data from files of interest rates reported by banks on 
new credit lines granted to non financial companies every year from 1988 to 2002. Bank 
loans are the main source of external finance for Spanish non-financial firms. The long period 
of time covered by the analysis includes a full business cycle and a period of nominal 
convergence in the Spanish economy before joining the EMU area. In this process 
nominal and real interest rates, together with interest rate spreads, have fallen significantly 
while financial institutions upgraded their policies towards credit risk. Therefore, the Spanish 
case offers a natural experiment to evaluate the relationship between credit market 
competition, use of collateral and credit availability. 
Using the province level data we find that the average credit quality of borrowers in a 
province decreases with availability of collateral and with credit market concentration 
in that province. We also observe that the cross effect of the two explanatory variables is 
positive, so the net effect of each variable is higher at low values of the other. The empirical 
relationship between interest rates of bank loan, collateral and market concentration is 
consistent with the results obtained with province data. A positive effect of market 
concentration in the availability of credit to borrowers of lower quality is also documented in 
Petersen and Rajan (1995) with US data on loans to small and medium size firms. But the 
interaction between credit market concentration and availability of collateral as joint 
determinants of the availability of credit for low quality borrowers is new in the empirical 
literature. 
Market power is a key variable in theoretical models but difficult to observe and 
measure in empirical analysis.  In this paper, as in Petersen and Rajan original paper, banks’ 
market power is assumed to increase with credit market concentration (Herfindahl index) of 
the respective province. Although the use of the Herfindahl index as a proxy for market power 
of banks in papers that investigate the relationship between market power and credit 
availability is very common3, there is also a controversy on whether the concentration index 
do in fact measure market power, specially in deregulated markets with free entry, Claessens 
and Laeven (2003)4. Our paper provides direct evidence that a bank in more concentrated 
credit markets charges a higher mark up in loans, supporting the use of the Herfindahl index 
                                                                          
3. See Cetorelli and Gambera (2001); Cetorelli (2004); Bonaccorsi di Patti and Dell’Ariccia (2005); Jayaratne and 
Strahan (1998), and Black and Strahan (2002). 
4. These authors find that in a cross country analysis the Panzar-Rose measure of market power is more correlated 
with barriers to entry than with market concentration, and from this result they question the use of concentration as 
a measure of market power. However, they do not account for differences in credit risk premium in the calculation of 
mark ups.  
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as a measure of the banks’ market power. To test this we have used the Lerner index, relative 
profit margin in credit lines of banks, as a measure of market power, where interest rates 
are actual rates charged by banks for this particular loan product and the marginal cost of 
the loan is calculated using data on the estimated credit risk of the bank. The unique dataset 
used to test the relationship between market power and concentration, together with the 
generalized use of market concentration in empirical studies on the effects of market power of 
banks in credit availability and the debate around it, makes this analysis of interest in itself. 
The results of the paper have an important implication for competition policies and 
for the workings of credit markets. Besides Petersen and Rajan’s (1994 and 1995) initial 
results showing the welfare enhancing effects of market power of banks in terms of helping 
young firms to get bank finance, other papers find mixed evidences and raise some caveats 
[see Cetorelli (2004) for a review]. Moreover, Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) find that credit 
market concentration has a net negative effect (when considering young and incumbent firms) 
on total credit availability. Our results suggest that as countries become wealthier and more 
collateral is available, there is room for increasing market competition and gain in static 
efficiency without endangering dynamic efficiency in terms of entry and growth of new firms, 
since to pledge collateral can substitute market power in solving moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems. 
The remaining of the paper is divided as follows. Section 2 contains the model while 
the database and the empirical hypotheses to be tested appear in Section 3. We show the 
results of the estimation in Section 4 and finally, Section 5 contains a discussion and the main 
conclusions. 
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2 A model of moral hazard in lending with collateral 
The model presented in this section is an extension of Petersen and Rajan (1995). In the first 
stage, banks face an adverse selection problem since entrepreneurs can be of good or 
bad quality (with a known proportion of each class in the whole population), but the credit 
quality of a particular borrower is unknown for the lender. If the loan is granted, in period two 
(second stage) there is a moral hazard situation since good entrepreneurs can choose 
between a safe and a too risky investment project. Banks are the only source of external 
finance, they can only hold debt claims and contracts cannot be made contingent on 
the project taken. Our main contribution is to introduce the possibility that borrowers pledge 
collateral in the loan they receive. The use of collateral allows lenders to charge higher 
interest rates in the early time periods of the relation without creating moral hazard 
problems in the decision about the project choice (safe or risky project). For this reason, 
collateral lowers the quality of the marginal borrower that gets finance. 
The model assumes a market with borrowers of two types, good or bad. There are 
three periods. At t=0 borrowing entrepreneurs can invest I0 either in a safe or in a risky 
project. If the investment is made by a good entrepreneur, the safe project pays S1 in t=1. 
When the project concludes there will be a new investment opportunity in a safe project of 
size I1S, that returns S2 in t=2. If the good entrepreneur invests in the risky project in t=1 
obtains R1 with probability p and 0 with probability 1-p. If the project succeeds, there is a new 
risky investment opportunity at t=1, I1R, that pays R2 with probability p in t=2. Investments by 
bad entrepreneurs get nothing in t=1, regardless of the project. 
Safe projects have positive net present value (S2 + S1 – I1s – I0 > 0), while the 
expected NPV of the risky ones is negative [p (R2 + R1 – I1R) – I0 < 0]. Future projects with 
positive NPV started in t=1, have all the same expected returns and investment requirements, 
regardless of the project chosen in t=0 (pR2 = S2 > pI1R = I1S). Finally, the entrepreneurs need 
bank finance in t=1 to continue investing since the revenues from the projects invested in t=0 
are insufficient to finance investments in t=1 (I1S > R1 > S1). 
At t=0 banks only know that a fraction θ of the entrepreneurs that demand finance 
are good, but each entrepreneur knows her quality. Banks learn about entrepreneur’s type 
over the course of the relationship, so it is assumed that at t=1 the bank knows the kind of 
agent it is dealing with. At t=0, when the information asymmetries exist, the lender has some 
discretion in how much interest to charge for the loan. But at t=1, under full information, it will 
charge a rate such that the return in loans is M, where M is a measure of the market power of 
the bank (M=1 in a competitive market, while M>1 indicates that the bank has market power). 
The risk free interest rate is supposed to be zero. 
In the Petersen and Rajan model entrepreneurs go to the bank and ask for a loan of 
a given amount and maturity. The bank responds by asking an interest rate with expected 
return less or equal to M. If no interest rate gives the bank an expected return larger than or 
equal to the opportunity cost (equal to one), it turns down the loan. 
Our extension of the model incorporates the use of collateral through its amount C, 
where 0 ≤ C < I0, at t=0 to secure the loan. We first solve the model assuming that banks 
quote the corresponding interest rate and ask for collateral. 
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Being aware that they can take advantage of the full information situation at t=1, 
good entrepreneurs will borrow the lowest possible amount at t=0, I0. If D1 is the amount 
that a good entrepreneur repays in t=1, the amount of funds to borrow in t=1 to invest in the 
safe project will be I1s – (S1 – D1). Given the outcome of the safe project in period 2, S2 , and 
the risk-free full-information rate M the entrepreneur pays for the borrowed funds, the 
net-profits in period 1 from choosing the safe project at t=0 will be: 
Max {S2 – M[I1s – (S1 – D1)], 0}. (1) 
Similarly, the expected profit from choosing the risky project having pledged 
collateral is: 
Max {p (R2 – M [I1r – (R1 – D1)]) – (1 – p) C, 0}. (2) 
Good entrepreneurs will choose the safe project if the expected profits are at least as 
high as the profits from the risky one. From the assumptions of the model, safe projects will 
be chosen if the repayment at t=1 satisfies, 
[S1 – p R1] / (1 – p) + C / M ≥ D1. (3) 
A second condition for financing the investment is that the bank expects to 
recover the finance provided in t=0, I0. Since the entrepreneur asking for a loan can be good 
or bad, the bank will get a positive return in the first case and zero in the second one. 
Charging M to the amount borrowed at t=1, the return for the bank in case the entrepreneur 
is good will be D1 + (M – 1) [I1S – (S1 – D1)]. The bank estimates in θ the probability that 
an entrepreneur is good, so the expected return from lending is θ [D1 + (M – 1) (I1S – (S1 – D1))]. 
This value has to be greater or equal to the amount lend at t=0, I0. Solving for the value of D1 
that satisfies this condition, 
D1 ≥ I0 / (Mθ) – [(M – 1) / M] (I1s – S1). (4) 
Combining (3) and (4), the minimum value of the proportion of good borrowers in the 
market θ that can get finance is given by θm (M,C) such that, 
θm (M, C) = I0 (1 – p) / [M (S1 – pR1) + (M – 1) (I1s – S1) (1 – p) + C (1 – p)]. (5) 
Equation (5) is an extension of equation (6) in Petersen and Rajan for the case 
when borrowers are asked to pledge collateral5, i.e., if C=0, then θm (M, 0) is the same as θ(M) 
in PR. 
Result 1: 
a) The use of collateral decreases the threshold value on the minimum proportion of 
good entrepreneurs in the market that get bank finance, compared with the threshold with 
no collateral, θm (M, C) < θm (M, 0). Therefore, with collateral, borrowers of lower credit quality 
obtain bank finance. 
                                                                          
5. That is, θm (M) = I0 (1 – p) / [M (S1 – pR1) + (M – 1) (I1s – S1) (1 – p)]. 
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b) As the market power M of the lender increases, the threshold value of the 
proportion of good borrowers that gets finance decreases. Therefore, firms of lower credit 
quality will get finance. This result holds with and without collateral and is Result 1 of Petersen 
and Rajan6. 
c) The rate at which θm (M, C) decreases with the use of collateral (market power) is 
lower in markets with more market power M (collateral), than in markets with less market 
power (collateral). This means that market power and use of collateral are substitutes when it 
comes to facilitate access to credit to borrowers of lower quality7. 
With collateral, the lender can charge a higher initial interest rate without violating the 
moral hazard constraint (3) than when there is no collateral, which implies that the 
non-negative expected profit condition of the bank can be satisfied with a lower fraction of 
high quality borrowers in the market. On the other hand, higher market power means that 
the lender can charge higher interest rates in the future and, thus, it can extract more rents 
from the borrower. In exchange, it can charge a lower initial interest rate D1, which in turn 
implies that the lender has higher incentives to choose the safe project. Alternatively, for a 
given repayment, banks can find profitable to grant loans with a lower fraction of good 
borrowers in the market. Result c) comes from equation (5) where market power and the use 
of collateral enter in a non-additive way and the presence of one of them moderates the 
contribution of the other to increase credit availability to borrowers of lower quality8. 
2.1 Loan interest rates 
The model can be extended to predictions about the interest rate of loans. In period t=1 
interest rate is equal to M but in period t=0 the interest charged is limited by the upper bound 
of the moral hazard constraint (3) and by the lower bound of the participation constraint (4). 
Both constraints are binding for the lower credit quality to get finance, θm (M, C). For a given 
credit quality θ, equation (4) implies that the lower limit of D1 decreases with M, and the initial 
interest rate charged to the lowest quality borrower that gets finance is lower in markets 
where banks have higher market power [this is Result 2 of Petersen and Rajan (1995)]. In our 
extended model, use of collateral raises the upper and the lower bound in initial interest 
rate. The raise in upper bound is immediate from equation (3) and the raise in the lower 
bound comes from equation (4) and equation (5); collateral lowers the minimum credit quality 
that gets finance and since θ decreases, the lower bound in initial interest rate increases. 
Therefore, collateral raises the initial interest rate to low credit quality borrowers. Equations (3) 
and (4) also show that the absolute slope of the relationship between initial interest rate and 
market power is lower in markets with more collateral. 
Data on interest rate of loans for firms of different age in a particular market are not 
available. For this reason, predictions on interest rates of loans to young firms as a function of 
collateral and market power cannot be directly tested. What we have is data on average 
monthly quoted interest rates of new loans granted by bank j; loans can be to firms in 
different provinces and to firms of different age, old and new, but these variables are not 
                                                                          
6. As in Petersen and Rajan, we draw the implication that a lower threshold for the proportion of good entrepreneurs 
in order to grant a loan implies a lower minimum credit quality of borrowers that get loans. This implication is justified if 
we assume that banks estimate the probability of a good borrower conditional to the information available at the time 
of the first loan, and they grant the loan as long as this credit quality is below the threshold. 
7. That is, the cross derivative of θm in (5) with respect to collateral C and market power M is positive. 
8. Inderst and Mueller (2005) postulate a model that also predicts a positive association between use of collateral in 
loans and credit market competition. Their explanation is based upon the finding that collateral allows lenders to extract 
higher surplus in competitive credit markets than otherwise and less projects with positive NPV are rejected. 
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observable during year t, where bank j can grant loans in several geographic credit markets 
(provinces) and to firms of different age. Interest rate of loans granted by a bank in a given 
period of time includes both, initial interest rates for loans that start in t=0, D1 in the model, 
and second period, t=1, interest rates for loans to good borrowers equal to Mj , where Mj 
represents the market power in the representative market of bank j. Interest rate of bank j will 
be affected by market power in a positive and in a negative way: higher market power will rise 
the interest of loans to good quality borrowers but will also lower the initial interest rate to low 
quality borrowers [equation (4)], so the net effect is undetermined. But we still expect that 
market power moderates the positive effect of availability of collateral in higher interest rates 
from the negative effect of collateral in average quality of borrowers that get a loan from a 
particular bank. Therefore, the effect on interest rates can be summarized in the next result: 
Result 2: 
Interest rates of loans to firms will increase with the availability of collateral in the 
credit market, but the increment will be lower in credit markets with higher market power for 
banks. 
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3 Data, empirical models and predictions 
3.1 Database 
To test the predictions of the model, the main sources of information are the Credit Register 
database of Banco de España and data on interest rates charged in new loans to firms 
granted by each Spanish bank. The CIR provides data on all new loans granted to firms by all 
Spanish banks and other intermediaries during a given year and their status over time. That is, 
any loan granted by any Spanish bank over a minimum threshold of 6,000 euros must be 
registered in the CIR. Given the small threshold, almost all loans to firms (i.e. business loans) 
are included. For each loan, information is available about amount, type of instrument, 
currency, collateral, maturity, identification of the borrower, industry, region, identity of the 
lender and if the loan is in default or not at the end of the year. Banks have access to the total 
exposure of the borrower in the Spanish banking system at the time the loan is granted. They 
also know if the firm is in default in any of its existing loans. However, the CIR does not inform 
about historical data of borrower’s previous defaults9. 
The time period covered in the analysis goes from 1985 to 2002. We identify 50 
different geographic markets, one for each of the fifty Spanish provinces. To test Result 1, in 
each province we measure market power, availability of collateral and credit quality of 
borrowers that get loans in the province. No direct measure of banks’ market power in the 
province is available because banks operate in multiple provinces and the interest rates in 
each province market are unknown. As Petersen and Rajan (1995), we assume that market 
power is higher in provinces with higher bank credit concentration, measured by the 
Herfindahl index of the province, equal to the sum of squared market shares of all business 
loans granted by banks in the province at the end of each year. 
Information about interest rates is available at the bank level. Spanish banks 
report monthly to Banco de España the average interest rate of loans granted during 
the past 30 days. We focus on interest rates for credit lines since it is the more 
representative loan to firms in Spain. The interest rate in credit lines of bank j in year t, rjt, 
is equal to the average of interest rates reported by the bank each of the twelve months of 
the year. We estimate the marginal cost of loans granted by a particular bank as follows. 
Let PD be the estimated probability of default for a loan granted by the bank, let LGD 
be the loss given default of the loan and let i be the risk free interest rate of loans of equal 
maturity. The marginal cost of the loan for the bank in period t is the risk adjusted rate li  that 
solves the equation, 
l li PD PD LGD i i(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 ) 1+ − + − + = +  (6) 
Solving for li , 
l
i PD LGD
i
PD LGD1
+ ⋅= − ⋅ . (7) 
The PD values are obtained for each bank using the CIR database and they are 
equal to credit lines in default of the bank j in period t+1 divided by total credit lines in year t. 
We assume banks have perfect foresight and at the time the loan is granted they anticipate 
                                                                          
9. A more detailed description of the CIR content can be found in Jiménez, Salas and Saurina (2006). 
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the observed rate of default in the next period. The LGD of each individual bank are not 
available and we assume, following BCBS (2004) recommendations, a common value of 45% 
for all banks. The risk free interest rate is set equal to the one year interbank rate. 
3.2 Empirical models 
The empirical analysis will focus on the predictions from Result 1 and from Result 2. Result 1 
refers to the quality of borrowers that will get bank finance in credit markets with more or 
less availability of collateral and with different banks’ market power (market concentration). 
Equation (5) and Result 1 are translated into the following empirical predictions: 
i) Average quality of borrowers obtaining finance will be lower in provinces with higher 
credit market concentration (higher market power) and in provinces where borrowers pledge 
more collateral. 
ii) The difference in the average quality of borrowers in the province with less 
collateral, with respect to the quality in the province with more collateral, is higher in less 
concentrated provinces. 
Credit Quality of borrowers that get bank finance in each province is measured, in an 
inverse way, by the amount of business loans in default (i.e. 90 days past due) or doubtful 
loans over the total amount of outstanding bank loans to firms in province i at the end of 
year t, PRBADLOit. A higher value of the non-performing loan ratio will indicate that the quality 
of borrowers that get loans in the province is lower than in other provinces where the ratio 
is lower. The availability of collateral in each province is measured in terms of volume of 
pledged collateral, that is, amount of loans with collateral over total amount lend to firms, 
COLLit. Market power of banks will be assumed to be proportional to the concentration of the 
credit market in the province, HERFINDAHLit. 
The empirical model is then formulated as follows: 
it it it it
it it i t it
PRBADLO PRBADLO HERFINDAHL COLL
HERFINDAHL xCOLL d
0 1 1 2 3
,
β β β β
η ε
−= + + +
+ + +
                         (Eq.1) 
where iη  is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for province i and 0 otherwise, dt is a 
time dummy variable and εit is the error term. The province ( iη ) and time (dt) dummy variables 
control for unobserved fixed effects. 
Taking into account that the dependent variable is an inverse measure of the credit 
quality of the borrowers in each market, the theory predicts (Result 1) that the estimated 
coefficients will satisfy β1 > 0, β2 > 0 and β3 < 0. 
The observed proportion of loans with collateral in a market will be a function of the 
amount of collateral borrowers can pledge and a function of the decision of banks to ask 
for collateral as a condition to grant the loan. We assume that potential borrowers have 
more collateral available to be pledged in richer than in poorer provinces. Wealth of provinces 
is measured by the house price index of the province in year t, HOUSINGit. On the other 
hand, the model in section 2 implies a lower minimum threshold for the quality of borrowers 
that can get a loan with no collateral, θm, in markets with higher market power of banks. For a 
given quality and personal wealth of borrowers, the proportion of loans (and volume lend) 
with collateral will be higher in markets with low threshold value than in markets with high 
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threshold. In conclusion, less observed collateral can then be expected in provinces with 
higher market power of banks. Therefore, the variable collateral can be written as a function 
of wealth and market concentration, 
COLLit  =  γ0 + γ1 Ln (HOUSINGit) + γ2 HERFINDAHLit (8) 
where γ1 is expected to be positive and γ2 negative. Substituting (8) in (Eq 1), we obtain the 
alternative empirical formulation of the model, 
it it it it
it it it i t it
PRBADLO PRBADLO HERFINDAHL Ln HOUSING
Ln HOUSING HERFINDAHL HERFINDAHL d
0 1 1 2
2
3 4
( )
( )
ϕ ϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ η ε
−= + + +
+ + + +
 (Eq.1’) 
where taking into account the values and signs of the original parameters, ϕ1 = (β1γ2 + β2) can 
be positive or negative since the two terms of the sum have opposite signs; ϕ2 = β1γ2 > 0; 
ϕ3 = β3γ1 < 0; and ϕ4 = β3γ2 > 0. 
The estimation method is the GMM for dynamic models with panel data [Arellano 
and Bond (1991)]. Firstly, this method takes first differences in (Eq. 1) to get rid off the 
province fixed effects. Then suitable lags of the levels of the right-hand-side (RHS) variables 
are used as instruments to build orthogonal moments in the GMM estimation. The validity of 
the instruments will be assessed with the Hansen’s test; Arellano-Bond’s test for 
autocorrelation will also be reported. An AR(1) process for the residuals is expected in first 
differences, because ∆εit = εit – εit-1 should be correlated with ∆εit-1 = εit-1 – εit-2, since they 
share the εit-1 term. 
Result 2, on the other hand, refers to predictions about the relationship between 
observed average interest rates in business loans charged by banks and market power and 
availability of collateral. Market power in the representative market of bank j is measured by 
the variable BHERFINDAHLjt, calculated as the weighted sum of the Herfindahl index of all the 
provinces where the bank has granted a loan in period t, using as weights the proportion of 
business loans of the bank in province i over total business loans of the bank. Availability 
of collateral in the representative credit market of bank j, BCOLLjt, and credit quality of 
borrowers that obtain a loan in such market, BPRBADLOjt are calculated in a similar way as 
the weighted sum of the COLLit and PRBADLOit defined above, respectively. 
The empirical prediction about determinants of differences in interest rates of credit 
lines across banks is formulated as follows: 
iii) Interest rates of banks’ credit lines increase with the availability of collateral in the 
representative provinces of the banks, but the marginal effect of availability of collateral in 
interest rates decreases with credit market concentration in the representative province. 
The empirical model is formulated as follows, 
jt t jt jt jt
jt j jt
Ln r Ln i Ln BCOLL BHERFINDAHL xLn BCOLL
LnGDPC (Eq 2)
1 2 3
4
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )α α α
α η ε
+ = + + − + −
+ + +
 
where it is the one year interbank interest rate which accounts for time varying changes in 
the risk free interest rate, GDPCjt is the gross domestic product per capita of representative 
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market of bank j in period t which is introduced for control purposes, and jη  are bank fixed 
effects. The specification of the model takes into account that from (7), perfect competition 
implies (1 + rjt) = (1 + it) / (1 – PDjt LGD). Taking logs to both sides of the equation we have the 
interest rate Ln (1 + rjt) as a function of the risk free interest rate Ln (1 + it) and of the term 
Ln (1 – PDjt LGD) that is the quality of borrowers of bank j. From section 2 we predict 
that quality of the borrowers that get a loan from a particular bank will be a function of the 
amount of collateral and of the level of concentration in the representative market of the bank. 
The predictions summarized in iii) imply a negative sign for α2 and positive for α1 and α3. 
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4 Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
The amount of loans in default represents, in average for all provinces and years, 5.41% 
of the total loans, Table I (Panel A). The dispersion is fairly high as it goes from 0.37% to 
28.34% with a standard deviation of 4.32. The period under study includes the deep 
recession of the early nineties that affected severely the most industrialized provinces 
of Spain. That is why average non-performing loan ratios increase significantly for the 
period 1991-1996, in sharp contrast with the final years of the sample. 
The average Herfindahl index across provinces and years is 7.57%, which implies an 
equivalent to around 14 banks of equal size in the province. Again, differences in 
concentration are rather high (minimum value of 2.52% and maximum of 42.48%, Table I, 
Panel A), and the numbers have to be interpreted under the intense merger activity that has 
taken place during the time period of the study, in both commercial and savings banks, and 
the expansion of savings banks outside their traditional territories10. The average Herfindahl 
index shows an increasing trend along time. Therefore, the consolidation trends dominate 
over the dispersion effect of entry of new banks. 
Finally, collateral pledged in loans represents, on average, 25.5% of the face value of 
total loans, although in some provinces and time periods collateral represented up to 58.7% 
of the total loans granted. The proportion of the number of loans with collateral (not reported) 
is 11.4%, lower than the proportion of volume, thus, the use of collateral is more likely as the 
size of the loan increases. 
Bank level variables include interest rates in credit lines, estimated marginal costs of 
these loans and characteristic of the representative market of each bank, such as availability 
of collateral, average quality of borrowers, concentration and GDPC. Panel B of Table I 
provide descriptive statistics for these variables in logs. We observe the decline in interest 
rates of loans over time from approximately 15% average in 1985-1990 to 6% ten years later. 
The decline goes parallel to that of the interbank rate that goes from 13 % to 4%. The Lerner 
index, Ljt = (rjt - ljti )/rjt  shows a negative average value for all banks and years, but we must 
keep in mind that the index is computed over credit risk adjusted marginal cost of the credit 
line and that the Spanish economy was in a serious recession during several years of the 
whole period. 
                                                                          
10. Average Herfindahl index for Spanish provinces is around half the average value of the Herfindahl index reported 
in US local markets (Metropolitan Statistical Area, MSA) and used in most empirical studies. For example, Black and 
Strahan (2002) report an average deposit Herfindahl index of 19.1 across MSAs in state (standard deviation of 6.7). The 
reason is that the province is a larger territory than the MSA. The coefficient of variation in our provinces, 0.5=3.5/7.6, is 
similar to the date reported by Black and Strahan, 0.4=6.7/19.1. 
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Table I. Descriptive statistics  
Panel A: Province level data 
Average, minimum, maximum and standard deviation values of the variables in the 
period from 1985 to 2002. PRBADLOit is the non-performing loan ratio in province i at year t. 
HERFINDAHLit is the index of credit market concentration equal to the sum of banks 
squared market shares in loans made in each one of the fifty Spanish provinces in year t. 
COLLit is the proportion of the amount of collateral over the total amount of business loans in 
province i at the end of year t. 
 
Panel B: Bank level data 
Average, minimum, maximum and standard deviation values of the variables in the period 
from 1985 to 2002. Rjt is the average interest rate of credit lines of bank j in year t. ti  is the 
interbank interest rate in year t. BPRBADLOjt is the proportion of bad loans in representative 
province market of bank j in year t. Equal to the weighted average of PRBADLOit, with weights 
equal to the proportion of total loans of the bank in the province in year t. In the same way we 
define and calculate bank level variables BCOLLjt, BHERFINDAHLjt and BGDPCjt from COLLit, 
HERFINDAHLit and GDPCjt, respectively. PDjt is the probability of default for credit lines of 
bank j in year t compiled directly from bank data. LGD is the loss given default assumed 
constant and equal to 45%. jtL is the Lerner index of bank j in year t, defined as Ljt = (Rjt -
ljti ) / Rj, where ljti  is the credit risk adjusted marginal cost of credit lines of bank j granted in 
year t 
 
1985-1990 1991-1996 1997-2002
Average Min Max SD
PRBADLOit (%) 5.56 8.48 2.20 5.41 0.37 28.34 4.32
HERFINDAHLit (%) 6.85 7.09 8.77 7.57 2.52 42.48 3.47
COLLit (%) 20.10 27.09 29.30 25.50 6.29 58.67 8.07
1985-2002
Average
 1985-1990 1991-1996 1997-2002
Average Min Max SD
Log(1+Rjt) 0.15 0.12 0.06 0.11 0.04 0.19 0.04
Log(1+it) 0.13 0.10 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.14 0.04
Log(1-BPRBADLOjt) -0.04 -0.07 -0.02 -0.04 -0.19 -0.01 0.03
Log(1-BCOLLjt) -0.19 -0.26 -0.28 -0.25 -0.68 -0.11 0.07
Log(1-PDjt*LGD) -0.04 -0.05 -0.02 -0.04 -0.60 0.02 0.04
BHERFINDAHLjt (%) 5.16 6.18 8.08 6.59 3.37 15.14 1.80
Log(BGDPCjt) 2.37 2.47 2.64 2.50 1.85 2.90 0.17
Ljt -0.11 -0.22 0.02 -0.11 -7.19 0.62 0.50
1985-2002
Average
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4.2 Herfindahl index as a measure of market power 
Cournot type competition in markets with homogeneous products predicts that, in 
equilibrium, the average relative profit margin (i.e. the Lerner index), of the firms in the market 
is proportional to the Herfindahl index of market concentration. It is also shown that 
collusion and monopoly solutions are easier to sustain in more concentrated markets than in 
less concentrated ones [Tirole (1988), chapters 5 and 6)]. These results justify the use of the 
Herfindahl index as a measure of market power. There is however mixed empirical 
evidence on whether the Herfindahl index is a good proxy of market power [Claessens and 
Laeven, (2003)]. For this reason we provide our own evidence in this respect. 
We test for a positive association between concentration and market power 
estimating the empirical model, 
1jt jt jt t j jtL L BHERFINDAHL d uα β η−= + + + +  
where Ljt is the Lerner index, dt is a time dummy variable and ηj is a bank fixed effect. We 
expect β to be positive. The first lag of the dependant variable in the right hand side controls 
for the great persistence of the variable over time. The Arellano-Bond (1991) dynamic panel 
data estimation of the model gives an estimate of parameter β equal to 0.179, standard error 
of 0.093 and p-value of 0.05511. Therefore, the hypothesis that higher levels of the Herfindahl 
index are associated with higher levels of market power is not rejected with our data. 
4.3 Access to credit in province markets 
The results of estimating equation (Eq. 1) are shown in Table II. The dependent variable 
is transformed so the domain of the new variable goes from minus to plus infinite: 
PBDit = Log [PRBADLOit / (100–PRBADLOit)]. 
Model 1 in Table II excludes cross effects between concentration and use of 
collateral for comparative purposes, while in Model 2 cross effects are included. Both models 
include as an explanatory variable the lagged dependent variable to account for persistent 
effects of bad loans over time. 
All specification tests (Hansen and autocorrelation) are verified. In Model 1 the two 
main explanatory variables have positive coefficients as predicted from the theory (although 
only the coefficient on collateral is significant) and, therefore, more collateral implies lower 
average quality of borrowers that get loans in province markets (i.e. empirical prediction i). 
In Model 2 the coefficients of the two variables continue to be positive but now are 
both significant and their values are twice those in Model 1, while the cross-effect variable has 
a negative and significant coefficient, as expected. This evidence is consistent with the 
theoretical prediction that credit availability for low credit quality borrower increases with 
collateral (market power) but the slope of the relationship is lower in markets with higher 
market power (collateral). Thus, empirical prediction ii) cannot be rejected.  
   
                                                                          
11. Time period 1985-2002. Equation estimated in first differences using Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator. 
Instruments used up to lag t-2 for the lagged dependent variable and lags t-2 and t-3 for BHERFINDAHLjt Hansen’s 
test gives p-value of 0.29 and the tests for first-order (m1) and second-order (m2) serial correlation of the residuals 
(in differences) give respectively p-values of 0.06 and 0.21, respectively. Robustness tests include estimation with 
market concentration treated as exogenous and with BGDPCjt in place of time dummies. In all cases the null hypothesis 
of no association between Lerner index and market concentration is rejected at p values of <10%. If we assume that 
the relationship between the Lerner index and the Herfindahl index comes from a Cournot competition model the inverse 
of the estimated beta is equal to the short term elasticity of demand of credit lines, while its long term value is β/(1-α). 
Since the estimated value of α is 0.631, then the implicit long term elasticity is 0.485. 
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Table II 
 
Results of the estimation of the model: 
it it it it it it i t itPBD PBD HERFINDAHL COLL HERFINDAHL xCOLL d0 1 1 2 3β β β β η ε−= + + + + + +  
on the determinants of average credit quality of borrowers that get bank loans in the different 
geographic markets (Spanish provinces). Time period 1985-2002. Equation (Eq. 1) estimated 
in first differences (to eliminate province fixes effects ηi) using Arellano and Bond (1991) one 
step GMM estimator. Dependant variable, PBDit, is the logistic transformation of the 
non-performing loan ratio in province i in year t (PRBADLOit) in order to have a non bounded 
dependant variable: PBDit = Ln[PRBADLOit / (100–PRBADLOit)]. The lagged dependent 
variable is introduced as an explanatory variable to account for persistence effects over time. 
HERFINDAHLit is the index of credit market concentration, equal to the sum of squared   
market shares of banks in all business loans granted in province i in year t. COLLit is the 
proportion of the amount of collateral over the total amount of business loans at the end of 
year t. Model 3 uses the log of Price index of housing (HOUSINGit) as a measure of availability 
of collateral in province i and year t. All the variables are treated as endogenous, using up to 
lag t-2. The tables show Hansen’s test as well as test for first-order (m1) and second-order 
(m2) serial correlation of the residuals (in differences). Standard errors (SE) of estimated 
coefficients consistent to any pattern of heteroskedasticity within banks. Year dummies, dt, 
included. ***, **, *, mean statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
 Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Dependent Variable PBDit PBDit PBDit
Estimation Arellano-Bond Arellano-Bond Arellano-Bond
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
  PBDit-1 0.634 0.036 *** 0.610 0.032 *** 0.616 0.050
  HERFINDAHLit 0.013 0.012  0.049 0.012 *** 0.193 0.100
  COLLit 0.014 0.004 *** 0.034 0.006 *** -- --
  COLLit * HERFINDAHLit -- -- -0.002 0.000 *** -- --
  Log(HOUSINGit) -- -- -- -- 0.599 0.205
  Log(HOUSING)it * HERFINDAHLit -- -- -- -- -0.037 0.015
  HERFINDAHL2it -- -- -- -- 0.002 0.001
No. Observations 800 800 712
Hansen test (p-value) 1.00 1.00 1.00
Test 1rst order serial correlation (m1) /p-value -4.90 0.00 -4.97 0.00 -4.67 0.00
Test 2nd order serial correlation (m2) /p-value -1.12 0.26 -1.11 0.27 -1.60 0.11
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The short-term difference in the proportion of bad loans in two markets i 
and k with levels of collateral COLLit and COLLkt, is given by (PBDit–PBDkt) = (0.034–
0.002 x HERFINDAHLt) (COLLit–COLLkt), or (PBDit–PBDkt) = 0.02(COLLit–COLLkt) for the 
sample mean of the Herfindahl index equal to 7.57 (Table I, Panel A). The sample average 
of COLL is 25.5% and the standard deviation is 8.11% (Table I). Therefore, provinces with 
a proportion of loans with collateral one standard deviation above the sample mean 
will have an odds ratio of bad loans 34% higher than a market with proportion of 
collateral one standard deviation below the mean: Log [PRBADLOit / (100–PRBADLOit)] – 
Log [PRBADLkt / (100–PRBADLOkt)] = 0.02x16.2 = 0.50. 
If we do the same calculation in two province markets with Herfindahl index one 
standard deviation below (above) the sample mean, HERFINDAHL = 4 (11), the relative 
increase in the log-odds ratio is 44.2% (20.4%). The results have economic and as well as 
statistical significance: In credit markets with “high” concentration of banks the marginal effect 
of availability of collateral in reducing the credit quality of borrowers that get a loan can be half 
the marginal increase observed in markets with “low” concentration. The complementary 
evidence provided above indicates that concentration is positively related with market power 
and therefore the evidence confirms the substitutability between market power and collateral 
in solving moral hazard and adverse selection problems that affect credit availability for new 
firms. 
Model 3 present the results of the estimation when collateral is replaced by a 
function of housing prices and market concentration, (Eq 1’). All the estimated coefficients 
are significantly different from zero and have the expected signs, including the coefficient 
of the Herfindahl index. The amount of loans with collateral in a market is function of supply 
(wealth in real assets of the market) and demand conditions (the threshold value of credit 
quality below which no loans without collateral are granted which in turn depends on market 
concentration) and when observed collateral is substituted by the function that is expected to 
determine it, the empirical results are exactly those expected, for example a quadratic 
relationship between proportion of bad loans in the province and concentration of banks in 
the province credit market.  Robustness test, for example substituting proportion of volume of 
loans collateralized by the proportion in the number of loans with collateral as explanatory 
variable, keep all the conclusions unchanged. 
Therefore, the evidence confirms that wealth conditions, availability of collateral, and 
market concentration (market power) are substitutes in increasing supply of bank credit to 
lower credit quality borrowers, in the sense that at high values of one of the two variables the 
marginal effect of increasing the other is relatively low. 
4.4 Collateral and interest rates 
We now test empirical prediction iii) estimating (Eq. 2), Table III. In Models 1, and 2 all the 
explanatory variables are considered exogenous since the interest rate (the dependent 
variable) is a bank level variable while the explanatory variables are province level variables. In 
Model 3 explanatory variables are also bank level variables and they are treated as 
endogenous and instrumented using the Arellano and Bond one step GMM estimation 
system. In this model the effect of the interbank interest rate is captured with the first lag of 
the dependant variable since the model specification test improve with this substitution. 
Model 1 is the one that directly tests the relationship between interest rates collateral and 
market concentration. In Model 2 collateral is replaced by the average quality of borrowers 
that get bank loans in the representative province of the bank. 
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Interbank interest rate is the variable with higher explanatory power for the interest 
rates in credit lines. Banks in provinces with higher proportion of loans with collateral and in 
provinces with higher proportion of bad loans charge higher interest rates in loans but in both 
cases the marginal effect of the explanatory variable is lower in markets with higher market 
power (higher concentration)12. For example, the elasticity of interest rates of credit lines with 
respect to the proportion of loans with collateral in the representative province of the bank 
is 6.8% if the Herfindahl index of the province is 3, one standard deviation below the mean, 
and 3,3% if the concentration index is 10, one standard deviation above the mean. 
Results of Table III, column 1, have been subject to several robustness tests. 
Model 3 replaces the province level variables of models 1, and 2 by the bank level variable 
proportion of bad loans of the bank itself, PD. As indicated above the variable is treated as 
endogenous and properly instrumented. The results are consistent with those of Model 2 
where bad loans represent average values for all banks in the representative province. 
Second, we estimate the model excluding those banks that concentrate the mayor part of 
their banking activity in one province, in particular banks whose representative Herfindhal 
index is above the percentile 75 (we also exclude those above the percentile 50). The results 
are practically unchanged compared with those of column 1 even in the case where the 
sample size falls down to one half. In another robustness check we add the Herfindahl index 
as an additional explanatory variable of the interest rates. The estimated coefficient of the 
market concentration variable is not statistically significant and the rest of coefficients slightly 
increase in absolute values13. 
 
                                                                          
12. Berger and Udell (1990) also find a positive association between interest rate and use of collateral in individual loans 
granted by US banks to small and medium size firms, but they do not explore the effect of market competition in use of 
collateral and implications for interest rates. 
13. Since the dependent variable includes interest rates of credit lines to old and new firms the effect of market 
concentration in interest rate is ambiguous. 
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Table III 
Results of the estimation of the model: 
jt t jt jt jt jt j jtLn r Ln i Ln BCOLL BHERFINDAHL xLn BCOLL LnBGDPC1 2 3 4(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )α α α α η ε+ = + + − + − + + +  
Time period 1985-2002. Models 1 and 2  estimated in OLS and Model 3 using the Arellano 
and Bond (1991) one step GMM estimator. The dependant variable, jtLn r(1 )+ , is the log of 1 
plus the interest rate of credit lines of bank j granted in year t, and ti  is the interbank interest 
rate in year t; BHERFINDAHLJjt, BCOLLj, BGDPCjt, PRBADLOAj   are bank level variables 
obtained as weighted averages of the respective province level variables using as weights the 
proportion of business loans of the bank in the respective province. PDjt and LGD are the 
probability of default and the loss given default of bank j; and jη  are the bank fixed effects. 
For Model 3 instruments used with jtLn r 1(1 )−+ , Ln(1-PDjt*LGD) and 
Log(1-PDjt*LGD)*HERFINDAHLjt up to lag t-2. The Table shows for Model 3 Hansen’s test as 
well as test for first-order (m1) and second-order (m2) serial correlation of the residuals (in 
differences). Standard errors (SE) of estimated coefficients are consistent to any pattern of 
heteroskedasticity within panels. ***, **, *, mean statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Estimation OLS OLS Arellano-Bond
Dependant variable Log(1+rjt) Log(1+rjt) Log(1+rjt)
Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E.
  Log(1+it) 0.857 0.013 *** 0.853 0.013 *** -- --
  Log(1+rjt-1) -- -- -- -- 0.695 0.024 ***
  Log(1-COLLjt) -0.083 0.011 *** -- -- -- --
  Log(1-COLLjt)*HERFINDAHLjt 0.005 0.001 *** -- -- -- --
  Log(1-PRBADLOjt) -- -- -0.207 0.044 *** -- --
  Log(1-PRBADLOjt)*HERFINDAHLjt -- -- 0.014 0.006 ** -- --
  Log(1-PDjt*LGD) -- -- -- -- -0.180 0.092 *
  Log(1-PDjt*LGD)*HERFINDAHLjt -- -- -- -- 0.035 0.014 **
  Log(GDPCjt) -0.031 0.006 *** -0.012 0.005 ** -0.084 0.009 ***
No. Observations 1,782 1,782 1,240
F  test   (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hansen test (p-value) -- -- 1.00
Test 1rst order serial correlation (m1) /p-value -- -- -8.17 0.00
Test 2nd order serial correlation (m2) /p-value -- -- -1.20 0.23
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5 Conclusion 
The important insight of Petersen and Rajan (1994 and 1995) that competition in credit 
markets can affect the marginal credit quality of borrowers that get finance ignores 
the possibility of pledging collateral. This paper extends the original model and shows that 
collateral lowers the marginal credit quality of borrowers that get finance but it does so in a 
more pronounced way in markets where banks have less market power. Alternatively, market 
power increases the availability of credit for riskier firms but at lower marginal effects as 
the availability of collateral in the market increases. That is, lack of competition and availability 
of collateral are substitutes in determining access of firms to bank finance.  The implication of 
this result is that as borrowers increase their wealth and have more assets to use as 
collateral, parallel increases in credit market competition will not lower the access to credit 
since lenders can substitute market power by the use of collateral. 
We also extend the predictions from the model to explain differences in average 
interest rate of credit lines. According to the model, credit risk of borrowers, market power of 
banks and availability of collateral in the province interact in a complex non-linear way in 
determining the average interest rate of bank loans. The main conclusion is that market power 
also moderates the expected positive association between availability of collateral in 
markets where a bank grants loans and average interest rates charged by the bank. The 
empirical evidence confirms that interest rate in credit lines among Spanish banks increases 
with the availability of collateral in the representative market of banks but the marginal effect of 
availability of collateral in interest rates is moderated by concentration in the credit market. 
The results are robust to other model specifications where collateral is replaced by direct 
measures of credit quality of firms that get finance. 
Market power and availability of collateral appear as close substitutes in determining 
the availability and terms of loans granted to young firms and the result opens new directions 
in the research on development of financial markets, business investment and economic 
growth. Models that link development of financial markets with economic growth of 
the nations, King and Levine (1993), Levine and Zervos (1998), Rajan and Zingales (1998), 
ignore the effect of cross-country differences in availability of collateral in such a link. The 
same is true for papers that investigate the reasons why financial development causes higher 
rates of growth. Papers addressing this topic, referenced in the introduction of the paper, find 
conflicting evidence on whether market concentration is positive or negative for credit 
availability, investment and growth. Our results suggest that static and dynamic efficiency 
brought about by competition in credit markets are possible if the increase in competition 
goes in parallel with the process of wealth accumulation. 
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